I. INTRODUCTION
A ggressive corporate tax planning has existed throughout history and will likely continue for as long as corporations are subject to tax. However, the degree of corporate tax aggressiveness can ebb and flow, depending upon whether corporations perceive that the benefits of such practices exceed their costs. This paper is divided into seven sections. Following this introduction, Section II defines corporate tax aggressiveness with particular attention to how corporate managers view aggressiveness. Sections III and IV briefly describes the recent history surrounding corporate tax aggressiveness, including: (1) the very aggressive state of corporate tax planning during the 1990s and early 2000s; (2) events that have likely curtailed corporate tax planning since the early 2000s; and (3) the current state of corporate tax aggressiveness. Section V discusses potential indicators of corporate tax aggressiveness based on publicly available data, while Section VI analyzes the aggregate and individual data from 21 public corporations. Section VII provides a set of policy options that could be considered to address tax aggressiveness, all of which are aimed at altering a corporation's cost/benefit analysis surrounding aggressive tax positions. Finally, Section VIII summarizes the key topics discussed in this paper.
II. DEFINITION OF CORPORATE TAX AGGRESSIVENESS
Although there can be many definitions of corporate tax aggressiveness, based on over 35 years as a tax professional, 1 the "real world" definition used by corporations is usually based upon the degree of tax risk a corporation believes it is taking. The two main components of tax risk are (1) technical tax risk, and (2) reputational risk.
Historically, corporations were primarily concerned with technical tax challenges to a tax position that could result in the payment of tax, interest, and penalties upon audit. However, high profile government hearings and whistleblower claims, coupled with a constant barrage of negative articles in the press, have caused many corporations to become substantially more concerned about reputational risk. In fact, some corporations are likely more concerned about reputational risk than they are technical tax risk.
From a corporation's perspective, the most aggressive tax positions are those that have both high technical tax risk and high reputational risk. However, some tax positions that may have only modest technical tax risk may also be considered very aggressive because of the reputational risk associated with the tax position. A prime example of this type of aggressive position may be the shifting of income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions or participating in a corporate inversion.
2 Both of these actions may be relatively sound positions from a technical tax perspective, but both could have significant reputational risk.
III. RECENT HISTORY

A. 1990s and Early 2000s
During this period, corporate tax departments were often viewed as a profit center managing a portfolio of tax issues with significant emphasis on reducing the effective tax rate (ETR) disclosed in financial statements. In addition, "retail" corporate tax shelters were relatively common. These shelters were aggressively marketed by investment banks, accountants, and lawyers under many marketing labels, including Tempest, Othello, STARS, and MIDCO transactions. Individual tax shelters like BLIPS, OPIS, BOSS, Son of BOSS, and FLIP were also actively being marketed during this period.
on at least a modicum of technical soundness. Most corporations successfully executed this strategy.
B. Post-2000
During this period, several factors impacted the ability of corporations to successfully execute aggressive tax planning, especially retail corporate tax shelters. These factors are discussed below.
Sarbanes-Oxley
Enacted in 2002, this far-reaching legislation effectively forced senior corporate officials to focus more attention on aggressive tax planning. First, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that CEOs sign the corporate tax return. And second, it required the board of directors (BOD) to approve all tax services provided by the company's external auditor.
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, a business's external auditor could propose a corporate tax strategy, issue a tax opinion, and then approve the financial statement tax reserve, if any, for the strategy. Some argued this was a conflict of interest. Although Sarbanes-Oxley did not prohibit external auditors from proposing and implementing tax strategies, the practical effect was that most BODs substantially restricted the practice, especially for tax strategies that could have a material effect on the business's financial statements. In some cases, BODs prohibited their external auditors from providing any tax services.
Regardless of a BOD's decision surrounding the provision of tax services by their external auditor or some other tax advisor, there were two major practical effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on corporate tax planning. First, BODs became more involved in tax matters. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the corporate tax department was often regarded as a "black box" producing low ETRs that rarely interacted with the BOD. After passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, BODs were required to become much more involved in tax issues as part of their greater financial statement oversight responsibilities, and had to specifically approve any tax strategies proposed by their external auditors.
Second, it became less likely that external auditors would audit their own tax strategies. Because of the appearance of a conflict of interest, many BODs prohibited external auditors from proposing material tax strategies. Thus, most external auditors started auditing other tax advisors' strategies. This likely resulted in a more objective evaluation of the quality of various corporate tax strategies with the result that corporations became somewhat less aggressive in their tax planning.
Substantial Increase in Corporate Tax Transparency
During the post-2000 era, there was a significant increase in corporate tax transparency. As a result, large corporations found it increasingly difficult to play the audit lottery (i.e., hope the IRS would not identify an aggressive tax position). Increases in transparency are discussed below.
Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation Number 48 (FIN 48). The adoption of FIN 48 in 2006
4 altered a corporation's cost/benefit analysis when considering whether to take an aggressive tax position. First, FIN 48 made it more difficult for a business to avoid recording a tax reserve, and second, the tax footnote disclosure surrounding unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) 5 increased significantly. For example, corporations do not like appearing at the top of the Ferraro 500 list of corporations with the largest UTBs.
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Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Position) . 7 The adoption of FIN 48 ultimately made it possible for the IRS to adopt Schedule UTP in 2010. In general, if a corporation records a reserve for a tax issue in its audited financial statements, Schedule UTP requires the corporation to disclose the tax issue to the IRS. The IRS's adoption of Schedule UTP was described by one former IRS Commissioner as "the biggest change in tax administration in the last 50 years" Fahey (2010, p. 371) and was met with almost uniform opposition by the corporate tax community. Nevertheless, corporations are now required to make disclosures to the IRS of many issues that would never have been previously disclosed. Schedule M-3. In 2004, the IRS announced Schedule M-3. The primary purposes of Schedule M-3 were to require corporations (1) to reconcile differences between the pre-tax income reported on their audited financial statements and the taxable income disclosed on Form 1120; and (2) to distinguish between permanent and timing differences in the reconciliation. The end result of Schedule M-3 is the IRS now has more information about differences between financial statement accounting and tax accounting.
The IRS Whistleblower Program. In 2006, IRC 7623(b) was enacted to encourage whistleblowers to report information to the IRS by providing for a reward of 15 to 30 percent of the additional tax proceeds collected by the IRS. Based upon discussions with corporate tax directors during my career, there are few things that cause more anxiety than the possibility that one of their trusted employees may become a whistleblower. In addition to effectively providing the IRS a detailed roadmap to areas of corporate tax aggressiveness, whistleblowers who go public with their accusations (e.g., like employees of Caterpillar and Levi Strauss discussed below), can quickly cause a nightmare for a corporation and its tax department. Thus, the fear of whistleblowers has definitely impacted the willingness of corporations to enter into aggressive tax positions.
In summary, increased transparency in both financial statements and tax returns has altered the cost-benefit analysis surrounding aggressive corporate tax positions.
Economic Substance/Business Purpose
Prior to the late 1990s, many tax advisors were of the view that the economic substance/business purpose doctrine, which requires that any tax transaction have sufficient economic substance and business purpose and not be designed purely for tax avoidance, was not to be feared. This view started to change with the ACM Partnership case, when the IRS successfully argued that one step in a complex transaction did not have business purposes and thus the transaction did not deliver the expected tax benefits to the participants. 10 The IRS continued to win similar cases during the 2000s, including all of the popular corporate tax shelter cases referred to as SILOs or LILOs.
Finally, IRC 6662(b)(6) and 7701(o), enacted in 2010, codified the economic substance doctrine, including a strict liability penalty and a requirement to disclose transactions that may lack economic substance to avoid an even greater penalty. The end result is that corporations now must ensure that any aggressive tax transaction has sufficient economic substance and business purpose.
Significant Increase in Reputation Risk
Prior to the 2000s, corporations taking aggressive tax positions and the lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers selling corporate tax shelters rarely incurred any reputation risk from their activity. Positions were challenged by various tax authorities, but this was always done very privately. This started to change in the early 2000s. The following events are especially noteworthy.
Enron Tax Planning Exposed. After Enron went bankrupt, the Joint Committee of Taxation produced a report that provided a detailed account of Enron's elaborate corporate tax planning (Joint Committee on Taxation More PSI Hearings on Income Shifting. From 2012 to 2014, the PSI held three very highly publicized hearings surrounding the shifting of income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, including creative repatriation strategies. The firms involved were Microsoft and Hewlett Packard, Apple, and Caterpillar (U.S. Senate, 2012 Senate, , 2013 Senate, , and 2014 .
UK Parliamentary Hearings. In November 2012, the UK Public Accounts Committee of Parliament held hearings surrounding the international tax planning activities of Starbucks, Google, and Amazon. As a result of the public backlash from those hearings, Starbucks agreed to make a 20 million pound payment to the UK government, and announced in early 2014 that they will move their headquarters for most of their international operations from the Netherlands to the UK which should further increase their UK tax burden in the future. In addition, in February 2013, the UK Public Accounts Committee held its second round of hearings on corporate tax avoidance, this time focusing on the Big 4 accounting firms.
Various Whistleblower Activities. An employee of Caterpillar became engaged in litigation surrounding Caterpillar's corporate tax planning, which resulted in many 11 See "Letter to Robert S. Bennett, Esq., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, regarding KPMG -Deferred Prosecution Agreement," U.S. Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/ pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf. 12 For more on this issue, see United States Attorney's Office Southern District of New York (2013). In addition, both Grant Thornton and BDO have had major issues surrounding their tax planning, as discussed by Rapoport (2013) and Joint Committee on Taxation (2003).
corporate documents being released into the public domain, and hearings being held by the PSI to investigate these strategies. In addition, two employees of Levi Strauss engaged in another highly publicized tax whistleblower claim. In summary, after the turn of the millennium, the reputational risk associated with corporate tax planning started to increase exponentially for both corporations and tax shelter promoters. Corporate tax departments and their BODs had become highly sensitized to the reputation risks associated with aggressive corporate tax planning.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF CORPORATE TAX AGGRESSIVENESS
Based on personal experience and discussions with corporate tax directors, corporations are, with one exception, generally less aggressive today than they were in the 1990s and early 2000s. This is not a startling conclusion, given the accumulated impact of the tax planning hurdles described in Section III.B. For example, most corporate tax departments now assume: (1) an uncertain tax position (UTP) will be audited; (2) their external auditor will take a hard look at the UTP for financial statement purposes; (3) there could be significant reputation risk associated with a UTP; and (4) a tax-driven transaction needs to have sufficient economic substance and business purpose.
The one notable exception to this trend is that many multinational corporations (MNCs) have become more aggressive at shifting income into low-tax foreign jurisdictions. This activity has been driven by the IRS's successful economic substance attacks on structured transactions. As a result, shifting income is the only feasible tax strategy left that can materially impact many corporations' effective tax rate. In addition, the 2004 enactment of a tax holiday on repatriated foreign earnings suggested to U.S. MNCs that another tax holiday may be forthcoming. 13 In order to maximize the potential future benefit of such a tax holiday, U.S. MNCs are shifting as much income overseas as they believe reasonably possible.
Recent Congressional hearings in the United States and Parliamentary hearings in the UK have further confirmed there is a significant amount of income shifting taking place and have led to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to initiate its highly publicized Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project.
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V. POTENTIAL INDICATORS OF CORPORATE TAX AGGRESSIVENESS
Based on my more than 35 years of corporate tax experience, I provide in this section my list of the best publicly available indicators of corporate tax aggressiveness. These indicators may be useful to others that are studying corporate tax aggressiveness and have far better statistical abilities than this author.
A. Low Total Effective Tax Rate
Given that FIN 48 has improved tax reserve consistency between corporations, a low total effective tax rate (ETR) over a number of years can be a very good indicator of corporate tax aggressiveness. 15 However, there is one major caveat, as U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require that U.S. income taxes be estimated on foreign earnings whether or not these earnings are repatriated, unless there is an assumption that these earnings are indefinitely reinvested. However, there is a disparity in practice as to how U.S. MNCs interpret whether the earnings of foreign subsidiaries are indefinitely reinvested.
Most U.S. MNCs assume a very high percentage of their low-taxed unrepatriated foreign earnings are indefinitely reinvested, whereas some assume substantial portions are not indefinitely reinvested. For example, Apple only assumes approximately 50 percent of its low-taxed foreign earnings are indefinitely reinvested even though they show no sign of repatriating their foreign earnings anytime soon. 16 As a result, Apple's reported ETR is substantially higher than if 100 percent of their foreign earnings were considered indefinitely reinvested.
Thus, when comparing ETRs across companies, it may be useful to strip out the increase in ETR attributable to deferred tax expense recorded for the unremitted earnings of foreign subsidiaries.
17 Furthermore, when examining the trend in the ETR, it should be noted that a reduction in the ETR over the years may in fact be due to income shifting to foreign jurisdictions.
B. Large Unrecognized Tax Benefits
Although disclosure of $7 billion of total unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) may earn a corporation the top spot on the Ferraro 500 list of uncertain tax positions, the more important indicator of corporate tax aggressiveness is total UTBs relative to the size of a corporation (e.g., as a percentage of equity or assets).
C. Permanent versus Temporary UTBs
FIN 48 requires disclosure of the portion of UTBs that, if recognized, will impact the ETR. This effectively asks what portion of the UTBs relates to permanent differences.
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For example, if Corporation A has $6 billion of UTBs and they all relate to permanent differences, while Corporation B also has $6 billion of UTBs but they relate to temporary differences, most observers should conclude that Corporation A has more tax risk than Corporation B. Thus, one additional indicator of corporate tax aggressiveness is the percentage of UTBs that are permanent rather than temporary.
D. Increases in UTBs Related to the Current Year
Since FIN 48 does not require disclosure of the cumulative UTBs by tax jurisdiction, it is very difficult to compare whether Corporation A is more or less aggressive than Corporation B, as well as whether a specific corporation is becoming more or less aggressive when compared to prior years. Fortunately, one of the reconciling items in the tabular roll-forward of UTBs is a disclosure of the increase in UTBs applicable to the current year. 19 The increase in UTBs attributable to the current year can be very useful in estimating how aggressive a corporation is with respect to a specific year's tax positions for all tax jurisdictions.
For example, one could analyze the trend in this amount in absolute dollars, but also relative to various measures of size (e.g., pre-tax income, revenue, equity, or assets).
E. Indicators of Income Being Shifted to Low-Tax Jurisdictions
As described in Section IV, many U.S. MNCs are shifting income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. When reviewing a U.S. MNC's financial statements, there are several potential indicators of income shifting, including:
The Amount of U.S. and Foreign Pre-tax Income Relative to Other Measures of Activity. Public corporations typically disclose in their tax footnote the U.S. and foreign components of pre-tax income from continuing operations. 20 They also usually disclose somewhere in their Form 10-K U.S. and foreign employees and/or compensation expense, and U.S. and foreign sales revenue. If the indicia of activity (i.e., employees, compensation expense, or sales) are radically different than the ratio of U.S. to foreign pre-tax income, this can be an indicator of income shifting. For example, in 2011 Apple had only 30 percent of its pre-tax income in the United States, but had 67 percent of its employees, 79 percent of its compensation expense, and 39 percent of its sales in the United States (Harvey, 2013a) . 19 Other reconciling items relate to prior years and are very difficult to interpret. However, if a corporation is either consistently releasing or adding to its net reserves for prior years, it can say something about the corporation's tax reserve philosophy (e.g., possibly a propensity to either overstate or understate initial tax reserves). 20 Although there can be issues as to how these data are accumulated (e.g., by the location of legal entity versus some other approach), they are the best available data.
Very Low Foreign ETR. Given that the United States has the highest corporate tax rate in the OECD, one would expect a corporation's U.S. ETR to typically be higher than its foreign ETR. 21 However, an exceedingly low foreign ETR (i.e., less than 15 percent to 20 percent), is indicative that foreign pre-tax income is likely located in a low-tax jurisdiction. For example, Apple's 2011 foreign ETR was only 2.5 percent (Harvey, 2013a) .
Cumulative Unremitted Earnings from Foreign Subsidiaries. Certain U.S. MNCs have huge amounts of unremitted earnings from foreign subsidiaries. For example, on December 31, 2013, General Electric had $110 billion of cumulative unremitted foreign earnings that are indefinitely reinvested. However, similar to the discussion of UTBs above, the absolute size of the unremitted earnings is not as important as their size relative to the corporation's overall size (e.g., equity or assets), or the growth in unremitted earnings as a percentage of total pre-tax income or foreign pre-tax income.
In summary, although there may be other indicators of corporate tax aggressiveness, the above list includes the ones that have generally been most useful during my career.
VI. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT DATA FOR SELECTED CORPORATIONS
Although the primary purpose of this article is to describe my perceptions of corporate tax aggressiveness over the past 15 to 20 years, selected data was collected and analyzed from the top 21 companies listed on the 2013 version of the Fortune 500. 23 The UTB data included total UTBs, the percentage of UTBs that if recognized would impact the ETR, and the gross increase in UTBs for the specific year. Other data included pre-tax income and expense on continuing operations, the allocation of pre-tax income between U.S. and foreign sources, the amounts of indefinitely reinvested foreign earnings, and the amounts of shareholder equity. Section V.A summarizes the aggregate data, and Section V.B summarizes selected data by corporation. Tables 1 and 2 summarize selected aggregate data from the 21 companies. Four key points can be observed in these data. 21 The foreign ETR is defined as foreign income tax expense divided by foreign pre-tax income. 22 See Table 3 First, although total UTBs have increased since the inception of FIN 48, they have decreased as a percentage of equity. This could be an indication that companies are being less aggressive, or at least in the aggregate are not increasing their overall tax aggressiveness. Another possibility is that planning has transitioned to strategies such as profit shifting to foreign jurisdictions for which corporations do not believe they need a material tax reserve. 24 Second, permanent UTBs as a percentage of total UTBs have increased fairly significantly from 2006 to 2012. This is consistent with the theory that U.S. MNCs are being more aggressive at shifting income to low-tax jurisdictions (i.e., the tax reserve recorded for shifting income should normally be a permanent item).
A. Analysis of Aggregate Data
Third, indefinitely reinvested earnings as a percentage of equity has increased significantly. This result is also consistent with significant income shifting. It also could possibly explain why U.S. MNCs are lobbying for either another tax holiday or a territorial tax system. The bottom line is it is becoming substantially more difficult for U.S. MNCs to run their operations when they have shifted so much of their income overseas and need the resulting cash back in the United States to pay dividends, fund stock buy-backs, or just to finance U.S. operations. For example, although Apple recently announced it will once again borrow about $17 billion to fund its dividend and share buybacks instead of repatriating cash, eBay has in contrast announced that it will eventually repatriate $9 billion for future U.S. needs.
Fourth, foreign pre-tax income was relatively stable during the financial crisis, but US pre-tax income decreased substantially. Again, this is consistent with the shifting of substantial pre-tax income to foreign locations (i.e., the negative impact of the financial crisis in foreign subsidiaries was offset by the shifting of income from the United States).
Although not dispositive, this data is consistent with the subjective observation that U.S. MNCs may have curtailed much of their aggressive tax planning strategies, while increasing the shifting of income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. Specifically, when considering that overall UTBs are only increasing modestly in absolute terms, and decreasing as a percentage of equity, the data is consistent with the theory that corporations in general have become less aggressive over the past decade for the reasons summarized in Section III.B. However, to reach a definitive conclusion, further research is likely needed by those that are much better statisticians than this author. Table 3 summarizes selected data from the 21 corporations. Four key facts are apparent in the data.
B. Analysis of Individual Corporation Data
First, IBM, Hewlett Packard, and General Electric have indefinitely reinvested earnings that are in excess of 80 percent of equity (228 percent in the case of IBM). These companies may have serious liquidity issues to the extent foreign earnings are needed to fund dividends and stock buy-backs by the U.S. parent company, or to fund U.S. expansion. Their alternatives for funding such needs would be either to repatriate their foreign cash reserves back to the United States and incur a significant U.S. tax liability, or to devise more aggressive and creative ways to get the cash back to the United States tax free. For example, to help finance U.S. operating needs, Hewlett Packard used an aggressive alternating loan strategy to repatriate cash to the United States without incurring U.S. tax. 25 Second, Ford, IBM, and Cardinal Health have UTBs that are in excess of 10 percent of shareholder's equity. These companies could be viewed as potentially being more aggressive than others. Alternatively, they could be viewed as having more upside potential if the UTBs are ultimately recognized. Third, oil companies have very high ETRs, but there is a wide divergence in the percentage of their UTBs that are permanent. For example, Exxon has no permanent UTBs, while for Chevron, Conoco-Phillips, and Valero over 50 percent of total UTBs are classified as permanent. This seems unusual.
Fourth, retailers have relatively high ETRs whereas technology companies (e.g., Apple and Hewlett Packard) have relatively low ETRs. This result is not surprising, given retailers have primarily a U.S. domestic footprint.
VII. POLICY OPTIONS
Assuming that tax policy makers would like to further reduce corporate tax aggressiveness, the general focus should be on increasing the cost to corporations for taking an aggressive tax position. 26 The cost to corporations could be increased through greater transparency and an increase in tax penalties. Several possibilities are discussed below.
A. Improve the Functioning of the IRS Whistleblower Program
As summarized in the Fiscal Year 2013 IRS Whistleblower Report to Congress (IRS, 2013) , the number of whistleblower claims the IRS received after the enactment of IRC 7623(b) in 2006 is staggering. Although many of these whistleblower claims relate to individuals, many also relate to corporations.
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As discussed previously, the mere existence of the IRS whistleblower program provides some deterrent to corporate tax aggression, but a fully functioning program could be quite powerful. Unfortunately, the IRS whistleblower program is not working as well as it should. For example, there have been over 2,300 whistleblower claims since the inception of IRC 7623(b) in 2007, but only nine payments (IRS, 2013) .
Although some of this apparently low success rate is explained by the need for the IRS to collect funds before a whistleblower can be paid, there are likely several additional problems with the current program that could impact the willingness of future corporate whistleblowers to volunteer information. For example, the IRS may not have the resources to investigate all serious claims or IRS agents may argue they have sufficient information without the whistleblower's information when in reality they do not. In addition, the whistleblower's confidentiality is not guaranteed and there is a long period of time before a whistleblower is paid for a claim (i.e., the IRS needs to collect money first, which usually does not occur until after all taxpayer appeal rights have been exhausted). Finally, the IRS and Treasury have taken various positions that reduce payouts to whistleblowers.
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If these problems could be adequately addressed, the IRS could improve its ability to attack corporate aggressiveness. The IRS whistleblower program is a major potential tool for curbing the most aggressive corporate tax planning, but unfortunately it is currently not operating anywhere near its full potential.
B. Make Improvements to Schedule UTP
Although Schedule UTP has the potential to be very valuable to the IRS, it is still unclear whether Schedule UTP will ultimately be successful. One important issue is 26 In addition, the tax law could also be changed to make it more difficult to shift income out of the United States and therefore reduce the benefit to corporations. This approach is not considered in this paper but is discussed in Harvey (2013a It is also far from clear whether the IRS is effectively using Schedule UTP information. In response to the uproar from corporate America over Schedule UTP, the IRS has understandably taken a cautious approach to implementation. Nevertheless, given that Schedule UTP has now been in existence for approximately four years, the IRS should make sure they are fully utilizing its potential.
In summary, Schedule UTP has the potential to be a very valuable tool for the IRS, but it may not be fulfilling its potential as the "the biggest change in tax administration in the last 50 years."
C. Improve Transparency Surrounding the Shifting of Income to Tax Havens
Given that MNCs (both U.S. and foreign) are being very aggressive at shifting income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, it is imperative that tax authorities around the world obtain increased transparency surrounding this activity. Fortunately, the OECD is actively pursuing country-by-country reporting and the EU has implemented countryby-country reporting for certain financial institutions (Ernst and Young LLP, 2014) .
Some might ask why country-by-country reporting is needed. In short, my experience is that without such reporting, many tax auditors will have difficulty identifying the appropriate issues to audit. For example, when preparing to give expert testimony at the May 2013 Apple hearing, it quickly became clear I needed a country-by-country analysis to identify the overall picture of Apple's tax planning.
Although tax auditors could request such information, it would be much better for MNCs and tax auditors if the information were prepared in a consistent format at the time the return is filed. Country-by-country information should include: (1) consolidated schedules of pre-tax income and tax expense prepared by a legal entity that agree to the consolidated financial statements; (2) taxable income and tax liability reported to a country by each legal entity (or entities filing a combined return); (3) indicia of activity in a legal entity (or entities filing a combined return) by country, including the number of employees, compensation expense, sales by location of customer, tangible assets, and amounts of passive income such as interest and royalties.
For purposes of the above information, "disregarded" entities, such as those created by "check the box" elections, would be respected as the true legal entities in order to obtain a more accurate and comprehensive picture of the worldwide activity of a MNC. In order to protect confidential information and proprietary business practices, country-by-country information should only be available to tax authorities. However, I would not rule out making some or all of the above information public in the future. Public disclosure of country-by-country information could increase a MNC's reputation risk and therefore deter overly aggressive shifting of income.
D. Increase Penalties for Taking Aggressive Tax Positions
All of the proposals in Sections VI.A-C are aimed at altering a corporation's cost benefit/analysis by increasing transparency and therefore making it more likely that a tax authority will discover there is an issue. If U.S. tax policy makers want to further alter a corporation's cost/benefit analysis, they may want to consider modifying the substantial understatement penalty. Currently, if a corporation understates its tax liability by certain thresholds, it can be liable for a 20 percent substantial understatement penalty, and up to a 40 percent penalty for gross valuation misstatements, including those relating to the Section 482 transfer pricing rules. However, the penalty may be avoided if a corporation has substantial authority for the tax position, or the tax position is disclosed to the IRS and has at least a reasonable basis for the position. 29 For corporate tax shelters, a corporation generally needs a more-likely-than-not level of comfort to avoid a substantial understatement penalty.
In particular, tax policy makers should consider requiring tax return disclosure of all uncertain tax positions to avoid a penalty (i.e., eliminate a corporation's ability to argue they either had substantial authority or a more-likely-than-not level of comfort surrounding a tax position). Alternatively, they could eliminate the substantial authority exception to the substantial understatement penalty (i.e., require at least a more-likelythan-not level of comfort).
In addition, in order to avoid a penalty, corporations should be required to disclose a tax issue to the IRS and be prepared to defend it. One potential problem with this alternative is that corporations may deluge the IRS with disclosures. In order to minimize the impact of this possibility, corporations should be required to disclose the dollar amount of the uncertainty so the IRS can focus on high dollar issues and issues related to tax haven countries if it so chooses.
Finally, the IRS could impose a strict liability penalty that is applicable if a corporation understates its tax liability by a certain dollar or percentage amount, for any reason. This penalty should be applied automatically, without potential reduction due to mitigating 29 See Internal Revenue Code (IRC), Section 6662.
factors. Although such a proposal would surely upset corporations, it could impact their cost/benefit analysis, especially when coupled with increased transparency.
VIII. SUMMARY
Aggressive corporate tax planning has existed throughout history and will likely continue for as long as corporations are subject to tax. However, the degree of corporate tax aggressiveness can ebb and flow depending upon the legal environment and whether corporations believe the benefits exceed the costs.
During the 1990s and early 2000s, many corporations pursued very aggressive tax positions. However, starting in the early 2000s several factors have likely altered the cost-benefit analysis surrounding aggressive corporate tax planning, including:
• The enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley;
• Increased transparency through reportable transactions, Schedule M-3, Schedule UTP, and FIN 48;
• The IRS whistleblower program;
• Increased reputational risk resulting from news articles, reports by nongovernmental organization, accusations by whistleblowers, and high profile government hearings;
• IRS success in winning several economic substance cases; and
• Successful litigation against tax shelter promoters (KPMG, E&Y, Jenkins and Gilchrist, etc ...).
As a result, corporations are generally less tax aggressive in 2014 than they were during the 1990s and early 2000s. However, there is one major exception: multinational corporations have become more aggressive in shifting taxable income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions through aggressive transfer pricing and/or creative tax structures.
Assuming policy makers desire to reduce corporate tax aggressiveness, Section VII of the paper also discusses several additional options that could be considered, including:
• Improving the functioning of the IRS whistleblower program;
• Making improvements to Schedule UTP;
• Improving transparency surrounding the shifting of income to tax havens; and
• Increasing penalties for taking aggressive tax positions.
All of these proposals are aimed at reducing tax aggressiveness by altering a corporation's cost-benefit analysis surrounding aggressive transactions.
